The Tax Court Revisits The \u3cem\u3eGolsen\u3c/em\u3e Rule: \u3cem\u3eLardas v. Commissioner\u3c/em\u3e by Tobin, Donald B.
NOTE
THE TAX COURT REVISITS THE GOLSEN RULE:
LARDAS V. COMMISSIONER
In Lardas v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court reexamined the Golsen doctrine2
and in doing so clarified the instances when it will be bound by circuit court
decisions. The substantive issue in Lardas was whether the return referenced by
section 6501(a),3 which provides for a three-year period for assessment of a
deficiency by the Service, was the individual taxpayer's return or the trust's
return when losses from property held in trust were in dispute.4 The Tax Court
held that the proper reference point for the statute of limitations was the
individual's return. Since the taxpayers had relied on a circuit court decision
that was contrary to this holding, the Tax Court needed to explain why the
Golsen doctrine did not apply.
This Note describes the Tax Court's rationale. In addition, it discusses how
the Tax Court's new interpretation of the Golsen doctrine will influence a
taxpayer's choice of forum, and several of the policy aspects of the decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Golsen History
Under section 7482(a),5 appeal from a Tax Court decision lies to the federal
circuit court of appeals to which an appeal would lie if the taxpayer had litigated
the matter as a refund suit in a federal district court. The venue of federal
district courts in tax refund suits is based on the residence of the taxpayer.6 Thus,
the legal residence of the taxpayer at the time the Tax Court petition is filed
determines which appellate court will hear an appeal. 7
199 T.C. 490 (1992).
2Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), afftd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971) (holding that the Tax Court will follow circuit court decisions with which it
disagrees only if the appeal in the current case lies to that circuit and if the decision is squarely in
point).
3Section 6501(a) states, "[T]he amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3
years after the return was filed."4The issue of which return is referred to in section 6501(a) was settled in Bufferd v. Commis-
sioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), which held that the return referred to in section 6501(a) is the return
of the individual taxpayer. For a discussion of the statute of limitations issue, see Deborah J.
Lotstein, Note, Statute of Limitations for Partnership and S Corporation Items Prior to TEFRA:
Which Return Starts It Running?, 45 TAX LAW. 1059 (1992).
'Section 7842(a) provides in pertinent part:
The United States Courts of Appeals, other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court, except
as provided in Section 1254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, in the same manner and to the
same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury; and the
judgement of any such court shall be final, except that it shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari, in the manner provided in section 1254 of
Title 28 of the United States Code.
628 U.S.C. § 1402 (1993).
7Section 7482(b)(2) allows venue in any appellate court if the parties so stipulate.
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Because, unlike federal district courts, the Tax Court is a court of national
jurisdiction, appeals from its decisions may lie to any of the several circuit
courts of appeals. When the Tax Court has been reversed by an appellate court,
and the same issue is before the Tax Court in a second case, it is faced with the
question whether it should alter its result and accede to the appellate position in
the first case, or continue to follow its original position in the present case.'
Prior to its decision in Golsen, the Tax Court considered its mandate to apply
the tax law uniformly to mean it should deferentially disregard appellate opin-
ions with which it differed.9 It reasoned:
[The Tax Court] must thoroughly reconsider the problem in light of the reason-
ing of the reversing appellate, court and, if convinced thereby, the obvious
procedure is to follow the higher court. But if still of the opinion that its
original result was right, a court of national jurisdiction to avoid confusion
should follow its own honest beliefs until the Supreme Court decides the point.' °
Thus, the Tax Court made it clear that it did not consider itself bound by circuit
court decisions."
This view of its judicial mandate was much criticized. 2 In Stacey Manufac-
turing, the Sixth Circuit strongly rebuked the Tax Court. The court stated, "The
Tax Court is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow, as the
settled law of the circuit, an opinion of the court of appeals of that circuit."'' 3
The jurisdictional issue has never been heard by the Supreme Court, and the
conflict between the Tax Court and the circuit courts is still unsettled.
'The same quandary is posed if the appellate court has spoken on the same issue in an appeal from
a district court refund suit, the appeal from the Tax Court's current case lies to the same circuit, and
the Tax Court disagrees with the appellate precedent.
9Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
'Old.
"One reason advanced by the Tax Court was that there were times when it reversed itself in light
of an appellate court's decision, only to find itself later reversed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 717.
See also William J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 586 (providing an example of
when the Tax Court changed position in light of circuit court); De Soto Sec. Co. v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 175 (1955), rev'd, 235 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1956) (Tax Court changed its position in light of a
circuit court decision, and was then reversed by the circuit court).
'
2See, e.g., Stacey Mfg. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956); Sullivan v. Commis-
sioner, 241 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957), affd, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); cf. Hearings on S. 2041 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 158 (1968) (testimony of Sheldon Cohen, then Commissioner of the Service,
in support of the Lawrence approach).
'3Stacey Mfg., 237 F.2d at 606. In Stacey, the court further stated that "the mere fact that [the Tax
Court] is a court having jurisdiction in tax cases throughout the United States does not establish the
Tax Court as superior in any aspect to United States District Courts." 237 F.2d at 606. But see Sirbo
Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 989 (2d Cir. 1973) (post-Golsen remand to the Tax
Court to reconsider it without being bound by circuit court's prior decision). In Sirbo, the Second
Circuit found that the prior case was not squarely in point, and observed that the Tax Court only
needs to follow a court of appeals decision which is squarely in point.
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B. The Golsen Case
Golsen v. Commissioner14 involved an insurance policy designed primarily to
provide tax advantages to policy owners. The Tenth Circuit, to which the Tax
Court decision would be appealable, had already held against these policies on
the ground that such policies lacked economic substance. 5 The Tax Court in
Golsen applied the circuit court's past decision, and in doing so explicitly over-
ruled Lawrence. The court stated:
[I]t is our best judgment that better judicial administration requires us to follow
a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our
decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.... [W]e think
that where the Court of Appeals to which appeal lies has already passed upon
the issue before us, efficient and harmonious judicial administration calls for us
to follow the decision of that court.'6
However, even after Golsen, the Tax Court continues to assert that it follows a
court of appeals decision only in the interest of "harmonious judicial administra-
tion," and not because it is bound by.the appellate court's decision.'7
II. THE LARDAS CASE
In Lardas, the Service disallowed losses from two grantor trusts, but the
notices of deficiency were issued more than three years after the grantor trusts'
returns were filed. Since the taxpayers (i.e., the trusts' grantors) had consented
to an extension of the assessment period for their individual returns, there was
no statute of limitations problem for differences related to the individuals' re-
turns." However, no similar extensions had been granted for the trusts' returns.
The Service argued that the section 6501(a) requirement that any tax be assessed
within three years after a return is filed applied to the return of the individual
1454 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
'
5Goldman v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 776, 778 (10th Cir. 1968).
S6Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757 (emphasis added). Based on Golsen, it is now possible for two taxpayers
to have the same factual situation and receive different outcomes from the Tax'Court. See Martin D.
Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A. J. 74, 75 (1984). For example,
two airline pilots took similar tax deductions. One then moved to Florida. The Tax Court followed
precedent and held for the New Yorker, but against the Floridian since there was no precedent in the
Fifth Circuit. Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971) (involving the New York pilot); Hitt v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971) (involving the Florida pilot).
71n Lardas, the Tax Court stated:
It should be emphasized that the logic behind the Golsen doctrine is not that we lack the authority
to render a decision inconsistent with any Court of Appeals (including the one to which an appeal
would lie), but that it would be futile and wasteful to do so where we would surely be reversed.
99 T.C. at 495.
RI d. at 490-91.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 47, No. 2
SECTION OF TAXATION
and not to the return of the trust. 19
The taxpayer argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelley v. Commis-
sioner,2" holding that the relevant return for purposes of section 6501 was the
return of the source entity and not that of the individual taxpayer, was control-
ling because the appeal of Lardas would lie to that circuit. As a result, the
statute of limitations had run on the applicable return-the trust's return-and
consequently the Service was barred from collecting the tax.2'
Because Kelley involved an issue factually similar to that presented in Lardas,
under the Golsen doctrine the Tax Court either needed to follow Kelley or find
that Kelley was not squarely in point. In distinguishing Kelley, the Tax Court
further defined the Golsen doctrine and explained when a prior case is to be
treated as squarely in point.22
Kelley and Lardas were substantively dissimilar in that Kelley dealt with an S
corporation, and Lardas dealt with grantor trusts. They were conceptually simi-
lar in that the income-generating enterprises in each (i.e., the S corporation and
grantor trusts) were not themselves taxpayers, but only pass-through entities; the
actual taxpayers were the S corporation's shareholders and the trusts' grantors.
Each entity was required to file an information reporting return; each payer of
tax was required to file an income tax return on which was entered items of
income, deduction, and credit derived from the entity.
The issue in Kelley was whether the statute of limitations was determined at
the entity or the individual level; the issue in Lardas was the same. Accord-
ingly, since the Ninth Circuit held that the measuring return was that of the
entity, the Tax Court was faced-in a case in which appeal ran to the Ninth
Circuit-with determining whether the Ninth Circuit's result was compelling
when the entity was not an S corporation.
In Kelley, the Ninth Circuit determined that the applicable return for purposes
of section 6501(a) was that of the S corporation. In order to reach this conclu-
sion, the Ninth Circuit examined the interplay between sections 6037 and 6501(a).
The court relied on section 6037 to find that a subchapter S corporation's return
1If section 6501(a) applied to the trust returns, then the Service would be barred from determining
a deficiency by the three-year statute, and the individuals would not be responsible for the tax. If the
provision applied to the individual grantors' returns, however, then the statutory notice of deficiency
would be timely.
20877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989). This case was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court in
Bufferd. See supra note 4.
2
"Lardas, 99 T.C. at 493-94.
22It was not necessary for the Tax Court to address the Golsen doctrine. In the past, the Tax Court
had criticized the decision in Kelley and refused to apply it unless the appeal was to the Ninth Circuit
and the case dealt specifically with a subchapter S corporation. See Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 863, 871 (1990) (rejecting Kelley and holding that the controlling return was that of the
taxpayer and not the S corporation); Siben v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. 524, 524 (CCH), T.C.M.
90,435 at 2117 (P-H) (1990), affd, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the holding in Kelley
for partnerships); Stahl v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 798, 803 (1991) (distinguishing Kelley and refus-
ing to apply it to partnerships even though the case was appealable to the Ninth Circuit); Bartol v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 2324, 2327 (CCH), T.C.M. 92,141 at 658-59 (RIA) (1992) (rejecting
Kelley for trusts).
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must be treated similarly to an ordinary corporate return.23 It concluded that
since an ordinary corporation's income tax returns cannot be challenged after
three years, then the same must be true for an S corporation's returns, and held
that the Service cannot adjust a shareholder's return based on barred modifica-
tions to an S corporation's return.
The Tax Court explained, however, that section 6037 applies specifically to S
corporations and not to the grantor trusts at issue in Lardas. This fact led the
court to question whether the Ninth Circuit would interpret section 6501(a) the
way it did in Kelley when section 6037 was inapplicable. 4
Because of the possibility that the Ninth Circuit might interpret section 6501(a)
differently in light of the fact that section 6037 was not involved, the Lardas
court determined it was not bound by its Golsen rule.2" Since the Golsen doc-
trine only requires the Tax Court to apply an appellate decision which is squarely
in point, if a taxpayer shows another possible interpretation of the appellate
court's decision then the Tax Court need not apply it.
26
Though perhaps subtly, Lardas appears to signal a change in the Tax Court's
approach in applying the Golsen rule. Prior to Lardas, the Tax Court deter-
mined that better judicial administration required it to follow decisions that were
squarely in point.2 After Lardas, the court now appears to focus on whether it
would be "futile to decide this case as we think right."2 "Better judicial admin-
istration" implies a deference to the appellate court, while "futile" implies that
the court will follow precedent only if it is has no choice but to view the
appellate case as involving the same issue on indistinguishable facts.29
The decision in Lardas implies that even if a prior circuit court decision is
very similar to a case pending in the Tax Court, the circuit court case may not be
considered squarely in point by the Tax Court if it believes that there is some
chance that its own position will prevail. Thus, when either party in the Tax
Court is faced with a seemingly favorable prior appellate decision in the circuit
to which appeal will lie, the tactic in dealing with that decision is twofold. First,
the party will naturally attempt to persuade the court that the rationale of the
appellate precedent is persuasive. In addition, the favored party will try to
demonstrate to the Tax Court that the appellate court would rely on the prece-
dent. The party burdened by the earlier appeals decision will, of course, argue
the other side of the coin.
"3The appellate court interpreted section 6037 to mean that "an S corporation's return must be
treated, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as a return filed by a regular corporation." Kelley,
877 F.2d at 759.
24Lardas, 99 T.C. at 496-97.
25The dissent found that Kelley was controlling and squarely in point. It believed that the ability
of the Service to adjust the tax liability at the source was the central issue in both cases and that the
policy considerations which led to this finding should not be limited to subchapter S corporations.
Id. at 504 (Gerber, J., dissenting).26Lardas, 99 T.C. at 495-98.
"Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757.28Lardas, 99 T.C. at 498.
29The facts in Golsen were almost identical to those in Goldman. Both cases involved the same
issue, the same insurance company, and the same type of insurance policy. Golsen, 54 T.C. at 756.
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Accordingly, the Lardas opinion puts both parties in the interesting position
of attempting to predict accurately how the appellate court would decide the
case to be appealed, and to persuade the Tax Court as to that outcome. That puts
considerable importance on the Lardas opinion's treatment of what amounts to a
squarely-in-point appellate decision.
Taken together, the majority opinion and the dissent suggest several views.
One view is that for a case to be squarely in point, there must be no other
acceptable alternative reading of the circuit court's decision, and it must be
futile to decide the case in any other manner.30 Another view, however, is that
the Tax Court should find a case squarely in point if the rationale behind the two
cases is similar and if it is likely that the appellate court will uphold the previous
decision.
III. IMPACT OF.LARDAS ON FORUM CHOICE
A number of factors combine to determine which of the three available fora is
most favorable to the taxpayer, given the fact that the forum is ordinarily the
choice of the taxpayer.3 One of the primary factors involves the use of prece-
dent-both that of the trial court and that of the court to which an appeal may
lie. The Lardas gloss on the Golsen rule must now be taken into account by the
taxpayer bent on litigation seeking redetermination of a proposed deficiency or a
refund.
The residence of the taxpayer at the time the initial pleading is filed ordinarily
determines the circuit court to which an appeal will lie.32 Aside from the fact
that occasionally an appeals court will give extraordinary deference to the Tax
Court's perceived expertise in federal tax matters,33 the taxpayer cannot simply
assume the Tax Court will follow a prior decision of the controlling circuit to the
same extent the federal district court would.34
'Lardas, 99 T.C. at 495-98.3 A taxpayer can file tax cases in the Tax Court, the district court, or the Court of Federal Claims.
Federal law does not require taxpayers who file in the Tax Court to pay any deficiency until the
decision is rendered. I.R.C. § 6213. However, taxpayers that file in district court or the Court of
Federal Claims must pay any deficiency and then sue for a refund. I.R.C. §§ 7421, 7422. In district
court, the taxpayer or the government is entitled to a jury trial. This may be advantageous to
taxpayers in cases that engender laypersons' sympathy, but may be beneficial to the government
when the taxpayer is a large, profitable corporation, or when the case involves indications of fraud.
32See supra Part I.A. When the parties so stipulate, venue is available in any appellate court.
I.R.C. § 7482(b)(2).
33
nverworld, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 868, 875 (1992) ("[T]he Tax Court deserves some
deference for its significant expertise."); Estate of Schnack v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 933, 935
(1988) ("[Djeference to the Tax Court's expertise on narrow technical issues may be appropriate in
some cases."); Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1983) ("We accord deference to
the Tax Court's special expertise.").
34See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 489, 494 (1979) (finding an appellate case not squarely in
point when the taxpayers interest in the appellate case was Ii remainder interest subject to divestiture
and the interest in the Tax Court case was a remainder interest not subject to divestiture), rev'd, 628
F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding the case squarely in point). See also Jeffrey L. Patterson & Susan
B. Hughes, The Golsen Rule 18 Years Later, 20 TAX ADVISER 122, 130 (1989) (concluding that the
Tax Court often does not apply Golsen when urged to do so by the taxpayer).
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The Tax Court willingly follows precedent when it agrees with the decision of
.the appellate court, but it is often reluctant to do so when it disagrees, particu-
larly when there has been a split among the circuits. Therefore,, although prece-
dent from the relevant circuit may directly support a particular view, the Tax
Court may nonetheless choose not to follow the decision if it has previously
been reluctant to do so when deciding cases from other circuits. Other things
being equal, a better option might be to bring the suit in district court, which is
more likely to follow the precedent.. -
In this situation, even if the taxpayer manages to maximize forum choice, the
taxpayer only gains an advantage -in the lower court. If he files in, district court,
he must first pay the tax and then sue for a refund. Even if he wins his case in
district court and the district court finds the appellate case controlling, the tax-
payer may still be faced with an appeal by the Service. If the Service is likely to
appeal, the taxpayer will be in the same position as if he had filed in the Tax
Court except that he will have already paid the tax and will be going into the
appeal having won in the district court.
For this reason, the main advantage of forum choice is in cases in which: (1)
the Service is not using the case as a test case and is therefore likely to accept
the lower court -decision; or (2) the Service thinks its chances for success on
appeal are very slim."
Another option for forum choice advantage arises when there is a circuit court
opinion that is not helpful to the taxpayer's case. In this regard, the Tax Court
might be more willing than the district court to distinguish the case and not
apply the decision of the circuit court. Since the Tax Court requires that the
decision be squarely in point and will. only be bound by the decision if there is
no other acceptable reading of the decision, the taxpayer may have far more
leeway in the Tax Court to distinguish the past decisions.
However, the taxpayer still only gains a forum advantage in the lower court.
The appeal from the Tax Court decision lies to the same court as the appeal from
the district court's decision. If the Service is serious about the issue, the tax-
payer will still find himself in the court of appeals and that court will surely be
more inclined to apply its own past decisions. Again, the real advantage of
forum choice in this situation is that the taxpayer will not have to pay the tax up
front and the Service may decide to appeal another case in another circuit as a
test case.
IV. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOLSEN DOCTRINE
Lardas and Golsen are attempts by the Tax Court to deal with a situation that
is unique inour legal system. The Tax Court is a court of national jurisdiction,
but its decisions are reviewed by circuit courts that have geographic, rather than
35The Internal Revenue Manual states, "Occasionally the appeals officer is faced with an issue
where the 'Golsen Rule' is applicable .... In cases where the 'Golsen Rule' is applicable, the
appeals officer should consult with District Counsel as promptly as possible to determine the amount
of litigation activity in other circuits and other relevant information on the Service's posture on the
issue(s) involved." I.R.M 8642.4.
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national, jurisdiction. There is a need to balance the Tax Court's interest in
applying the tax law uniformly with the traditional appellate interests of the
circuit courts. The Tax Court believes that tax law should be applied uniformly
throughout the nation regardless of the federal appellate court venue in which
the taxpayer resides,36 and appellate courts believe they have a right to expect
that an inferior court will follow their decision.37
The Tax Court viewed the Golsen doctrine as a necessary exercise in "effi-
cient and harmonious judicial administration."3 It weighed efficiency against
the court's position as a court of national jurisdiction, and recognized that it was
inefficient to require a party to appeal a decision that was certain to be over-
turned on appeal.39 It determined that judicial efficiency outweighed its own
institutional and jurisdictional goals.
A. Legislative Action
When Congress originally created the predecessor to the Tax Court, the Board
of Tax Appeals, as an executive agency,40 it established review procedures for
the board's decisions, and these procedures were intended to conform as much
as possible to those of the district courts.4 As the court in Lawrence suggests,
Congress did desire uniformity regarding tax law, but Congress suggested that
uniformity should be derived from consultations among circuit court judges,
rather than by an independent Tax Court. 2 Congress believed both in the need
for uniformity in the application of the tax law, and in the need to give deference
36There is a question of why it is essential for tax laws to be more uniform than other national
laws. Other federal statutes are interpreted by the appellate courts, and these statutes are often
interpreted differently in each of the circuits. The Supreme Court reviews these circuit conflicts in
its discretion and acts no differently in tax matters. Tax law would be equally uniform if the Tax
Court applied precedent in a manner similar to the district courts. The Supreme Court would then,
just as they do now, decide the national law when the circuits are in conflict. For a good discussion
of this matter, see Holden, infra note 44, at 642.
37Stacey Mfg., 237 F.2d at 606 (stating that the Tax Court is not lawfully privileged to disregard
and refuse to follow an opinion of the court of appeals for that circuit); Sullivan, 241 F.2d at 47
(holding that a decision by the Tax Court that overrules a decision of the court of appeals is not
consonant with the responsibilities of the respective tribunals involved); Holt v. Commissioner, 266
F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1955) ("We seem to play at hide-and-go-seek with the Tax Court."), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 982 (1956).
3 Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757.
3 The Tax Court stated in Lardas:
In such a case, it would appear a virtual certainty that the nonprevailing party will appeal and
secure a reversal from the Court of Appeals. In such a circumstance, the application of the
Lawrence doctrine would ensure the waste of substantial resources, both of the taxpayer and of the
court system, and, ultimately achieve nothing.
99 T.C. at 494.
40
HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 59 (1989). In 1969,
the Tax Court was converted from an executive agency to an Article I legislative court. Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730-36 (1969).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926) ("The procedure is made to conform as nearly
as may be to the procedure in the case of an original action in a federal district court.").421d. at 20.
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to the circuit courts; however, it failed to provide any specific method for recon-
ciling those two concerns.
One suggestion to solve the problem has been proposed by the Federal Courts
Study Commission to reform the Tax Court.43 In its report, the Commission
recommended changing the Tax Court by creating an Article III appellate divi-
sion of the Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction over tax issues, or in the
alternative, creating a national appellate court to oversee the Tax Court, while
keeping the district courts as an alternative forum for tax disputes.' This pro-
posal has not been embraced by Congress, however, and has found considerable
opposition from tax practitioners.45
B. Supreme Court Action
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to settle the dispute between the Tax
Court and the courts of appeals.46  However, the Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed the jurisdiction and authority of the Tax Court in Freytag v. Commis-
sioner,47 and held that the Tax Court was an Article I court, similar to federal
district courts.48 In doing so, the court rejected an argument that the Tax Court
was only a department under the executive branch.49
The Tax Court is now uniquely positioned in our legal system. It is not an
Article III court, and it is not an executive agency. This gives some support to
the Tax Court's assertion that it is a court of national jurisdiction with unique
responsibilities and therefore is not required to follow the decisions of the appel-
late courts. If the Tax Court is not an Article III court, then maybe the appellate
courts do not have direct control over the Tax Court.
Equally possible, however, is the idea that Freytag stands for the proposition
43 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 69-73
(1990) [hereinaftei FEDERAL COURTS REPORT].
"Id. at 69-71. See also Martin D. Ginsburg, Commentary: The Federal Courts Study Committee
on Claims Court Tax Jurisdiction, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 631 (1991); cf. James P. Holden, The Federal
Courts Study Committee Has Not Made the Case for Its Proposed Overhaul of the Tax Litigation
Process, 40 CATH U.L. REV. 639 (1991).
45Holden, supra note 44; ABA Tax Section Criticizes Centralized Tax Court Proposal, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Mar. 5, 1990) (LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file, elec. cit. 90 TNT 63-17) (letter from James P.
Holden, American Bar Association, expressing the ABA's opposition to the proposal); Nims' State-
ment Before ABA Tax Section Opposes National Court of Tax Appeals, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 2,
1990) (LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file, elec. cit. 90 TNT 30-9); FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 43,
at 71-72.
'he Court declined certiorari in Golsen. 404 U.S. 940 (1971). In Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957), aff d, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), the appellate court strongly criticized the Tax
Court stating "a decision by one judge of the Tax Court, which, in effect, overrules a decision of the
court of appeals in the circuit in which both cases arose, is not consonant with the responsibilities of
the respective tribunals involved." Though the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it did not address
the jurisdictional issue.
41111 S. Ct. 2631, 2645 (1991).
4"Freytag, Ill S. Ct at 2645-46; see Lawrence M. Stratton, Jr., Note, Special Trial Judges, the Tax
Court and the Appointments Clause: Freytag v. Commissioner, 45 TAX LAW. 497 (1992).
4'Freytag was only a five to four decision. The dissent found the Tax Court to be a department in
the executive branch and the Chief Judge to be the department head. Freytag, I II S. Ct. at 2651
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that the Tax Court's function is similar to that of district courts. As the Supreme
Court said in Freytag: "The Tax Court's function and role in the federal judicial
scheme closely resembles those of the federal district courts, which indisputably
are 'Courts of Law.' Furthermore, the Tax Court exercises its judicial power in
much the same way as the federal district courts exercise theirs."50 If the Su-
preme Court views the Tax Court as a court similar to the district courts, one
consequence of that interpretation is that the Tax Court may be: expected to
apply the law of appellate courts just as a district court would."
C. Tax Court's Jurisdiction
Another policy concern is that the Tax Court may have actually weakened its
jurisdiction through its attempt to consolidate tax policy. Because the Tax Court
might not follow a favorable appellate decision of the circuit court to which the
case is appealable, taxpayers may choose other fora. As taxpayers seek relief in
other courts, the Tax Court will hear fewer of the conflicting cases and have less
ability to create a uniform body of tax law. In those cases in which taxpayers
choose to litigate in the Tax Court first (in order to obtain the advantage of not
prepaying the tax) and then appeal, the court will likely be viewed more as a
preliminary hurdle to litigation rather than as a final arbiter of choice.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court's recent decision in Lardas clarifies when the court will apply
circuit court decisions, and suggests that it will apply them less frequently.
Although a less deferential standard in applying precedent from circuit courts
will promote uniformity in Tax Court decisions, it is unlikely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the broader body of all case law, because decisions of the Tax
Court are appealable to twelve different courts of appeals-each of which is
comprised of a number of different judges. For this reason, efficient judicial
administration and concerns for uniformity would both be better served by a
standard that is more, not less, inclined to honor precedent.
Donald B. Tobin
5
°Freytag, I I l S. Ct. at 2645.5
'Though outside the scope of this Note, Lardas may not only be a case refining the Golsen
doctrine, but may also be an attempt by the Tax Court to reassert its independence after the Supreme
Court's decision in Freytag. This idea is strengthened by the Tax Court's recent decision in Estate
of Mueller v. Commissioner, in which the Tax Court again reasserted its authority. 101 T.C. No. 37
at 4496 (CCH), 281 (RIA) (Dec. 13, 1993). In Mueller, the Tax Court held that it had the power to
consider the affirmative defense of equitable recoupment and rejected past cases that suggested the
court did not have this authority. Id. at 4501 (CCH), 286 (RIA). In addition, the concurrence
stressed that the Tax Court is the court of choice for tax disputes and that it "exercise[s] a portion of
the judicial power of the United States." Id. at 4502 (CCH), 286 (RIA) (Halpem, J., concurring).
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